Philosophy of Science Association A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation by Peter Railton
Philosophy of Science Association
A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation
Author(s): Peter Railton
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 206-226




Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Philosophy of Science Association and The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science.
http://www.jstor.org




It has been the dominant view that probabilistic explanations of particular 
facts must be inductive in character. I argue here that this view is mistaken, 
and that the aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the 
explanandum fact was nomically expectable, but to give an account of the 
chance mechanism(s) responsible for it. To this end, a deductive-nomological 
model of probabilistic explanation is developed and defended. Such a model 
has application only when the probabilities occurring in covering laws can 
be interpreted as measures of objective chance, expressing the strength of 
physical propensities. Unlike inductive models of probabilistic explanation, 
this deductive model stands in no need of troublesome requirements of maximal 
specificity or epistemic relativization. 
What if some things happen by chance-can they nonetheless be 
explained? How? 
Some things do happen by chance, according to the dominant 
interpretation of our present physical theory, the probabilistic inter- 
pretation of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, they can be explained: 
by that theory, in virtually the same way as deterministic phenom- 
ena-deductive-nomologically. At least, that is what I hope to show 
in this paper. 
Our universe may not be deterministic, but all is not chaos. It 
is governed by laws of two kinds: probabilistic (such as the laws 
concerning barrier penetration and certain other quantum phenomena) 
and non-probabilistic (such as the laws of conservation of mass-energy, 
charge, momentum, etc.).' Were the probabilism of laws of the first 
sort remediable by suitable elaboration of laws of the second sort, 
*Received September, 1977. 
tI would like to thank C. G. Hempel, Richard C. Jeffrey, and David Lewis for 
helpful criticisms of earlier drafts. I am especially indebted to David Lewis for the 
idea that a propensity interpretation of probability sits best with the account of 
probabilistic explanation given here. I have greatly benefited from discussions of related 
matters with Sam Scheffler and David Fair. 
'Let us say rather loosely that a system is deterministic if, for any one instant, 
its state is physically compatible with only one (not necessarily different) state at 
each other instant. A system is indeterministic otherwise, but lawfully so if a complete 
description of its state at some one instant plus all true laws together entail a distribution 
of probabilities over possible states at later times. 
Philosophy of Science, 45 (1978) pp. 206-226. 
Copyright ? 1978 by the Philosophy of Science Association. 
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the universe would be deterministic after all, and the problem of 
explaining chance phenomena would no longer be with us. However, 
indications are that physical indeterminism is irremediable, and that 
the universe exhibits not only chances, but lawful chances. I will 
argue that we come to understand chance phenomena, even when 
the chance involved is extremely remote, by subsuming them under 
these irremediably probabilistic laws. 
1. Introductory Remarks on Explanation. Do I offer a deductive- 
nomological (D-N) model of probabilistic explanation because I believe 
that nomic subsumption always explains?-No. There are familiar- 
enough kinds of non-explanatory D-N arguments, for example, those 
that deduce the explanandum from nomically-related symptoms or 
after-the-fact conditions alone, citing no causes. 
Yet it will not do simply to add to the D-N model a requirement 
that the explanans contain causes whenever the explanandum is a 
particular fact. First, some particular facts may be explained non-caus- 
ally, e.g., by subsumption under structural laws such as the Pauli 
exclusion principle. Second, even where causal explanation is called 
for, the existence of general, causal laws that cover the explanandum 
has not always been sufficient for explanation: the search for explana- 
tion has also taken the form of a search for mechanisms that underlie 
these laws. 'Mechanisms,' however, is not meant to suggest a parochial 
attitude toward the nomic connections-deterministic or otherwise- 
that tie the world together and make explanation possible. 
An example may help clarify the notion of mechanism appealed 
to here. The following D-N argument suffices to forecast that nasty 
weather lies ahead, but not to explain why this is so: 
(S) The glass is falling. 
Whenever the glass falls the weather turns bad. 
The weather will turn bad. ([5], p. 106) 
Now nothing works like a barometer for predicting the weather, but 
nothing like a barometer works for changing it. So it is often maintained 
that (S) lacks explanatory efficacy because barometers lack the 
appropriate causal efficacy. The following inference, then, remedies 
the lack of the first because "it proves that the fact is a fact by 
citing causes and not mere symptoms" ([5], p. 107): 
(C) The glass is falling. 




Whenever the atmospheric pressure is falling the weather 
turns bad. 
The weather will turn bad. ([5], p. 106) 
Yet as explanations go, (C) is also lacking: we remain in the dark 
as to why the weather will turn bad. No connection between cause 
and effect, no mechanism by which falling atmospheric pressure 
produces a change for the worse in the weather, has been revealed. 
I do not doubt that some account of this mechanism exists; my point 
is that its existence is what makes (C) superior to (S) for explanatory 
purposes. 
(C), if moderated by boundary conditions and put less qualitatively, 
would supply us the capability to predict and control the weather 
(whenever, as in a laboratory simulator, we can manipulate the 
atmospheric pressure). While prediction and control may exhaust our 
practical problems in the natural world, the unsatisfactoriness of (C) 
shows that explanation is an activity not wholly practical in purpose. 
The goal of understanding the world is a theoretical goal, and if 
the world is a machine-a vast arrangement of nomic connections- 
then our theory ought to give us some insight into the structure and 
workings of the mechanism, above and beyond the capability of 
predicting and controlling its outcomes. Until supplemented with an 
account of the nomic links connecting changes in atmospheric pressure 
to changes in the weather, (C) will explain but poorly. Knowing enough 
to subsume an event under the right kind of laws is not, therefore, 
tantamount to knowing the how or why of it. As the explanatory 
inadequacies of successful practical disciplines remind us: explanations 
must be more than potentially-predictive inferences or law-invoking 
recipes. 
Is the deductive-nomological model of explanation therefore unac- 
ceptable?-No, just incomplete. Calling for an account of the mecha- 
nism leaves open the nature of that account, and as far as I can 
see, the model explanations offered in scientific texts are D-N when 
complete, D-N sketches when not. What is being urged is that D-N 
explanations making use of true, general, causal laws may legitimately 
be regarded as unsatisfactory unless we can back them up with an 
account of the mechanism(s) at work. "An account of the mecha- 
nism(s)" is a vague notion, and one obviously admitting of degrees 
of thoroughness, but I will not have much to say here by way of 
demystification. If one sees what is lacking in (C)-a characterization, 
whether sketchy or blow-by-blow, of how it is that declining atmo- 
spheric pressure effects the changes we describe as "a worsening 
of the weather," i.e., a more or less complete filling-in of the links 
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in the causal chains-one has the rough idea. 
The D-N probabilistic explanations to be given below do not explain 
by giving a deductive argument terminating in the explanandum, for 
it will be a matter of chance, resisting all but expostfacto demonstration. 
Rather, these explanations subsume a fact in the sense of giving 
a D-N account of the chance mechanism responsible for it, and showing 
that our theory implies the existence of some physical possibility, 
however small, that this mechanism will produce the explanandum 
in the circumstances given. I hope the remarks just made about the 
importance of revealing mechanisms have eased the way for an account 
of probabilistic explanation that focuses on the indeterministic mecha- 
nisms at work, rather than the "nomic expectability" of the explanan- 
dum. 
2. Hempel's Inductive-Statistical Model. For Hempel, a statistical 
explanation (what is called elsewhere in this paper 'a probabilistic 
explanation') is one that "makes essential use of at least one law 
or theoretical principle of statistical form" ([3], p. 380). Since Hempel 
distinguishes between statistical laws and mere statistical general- 
izations, and asserts that the former apply only where "peculiar, 
namely probabilistic, modes of connection" exist among the phenome- 
na ([3], p. 377), his characterization permits statistical explanation 
only of genuinely indeterministic processes.2 Were some process to 
have the appearance of indeterminism owing to arcane workings or 
uncontrolled initial conditions, then no "peculiar . . . probabilistic" 
modes of connection would figure essentially in explaining this "pseu- 
do-random" process's outcomes. Not only would statistical explana- 
tion be unnecessary for such a process, it would be impossible: no 
probabilistic laws would govern it. 
For example, it has been observed that 99% of all cases of infectious 
mononucleosis involve lymph-gland swelling. The exceptions might 
be due to a process that randomly misfires 1% of the time. Or, they 
might arise from the operation of an unknown deterministic mechanism 
that works to inhibit swelling whenever a patient begins in a particular 
initial condition, which as a mere matter of fact is typical of 1% 
of the population. If initial conditions could be partitioned into two 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes S and -S, such 
that all Ss by law eventually develop swelling, and all -Ss do not, 
the generalization '99% of all cases of infectious mononucleosis develop 
lymph-gland swelling' would have been shown to be no law, but 
2Although there is some difficulty in reconciling all that is said in [3] with this 
conclusion, Hempel now accepts it (personal communication). 
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merely a descriptive report of observed relative frequencies. No law, 
it cannot support a statistical explanation. But discovering it not to 
be a law is just discovering that statistical explanation is uncalled 
for, since each case of mononucleosis will have been of type S or 
type -S from the outset. 
On the other hand, suppose that no such partition of initial conditions 
exists. Then the presence or absence of swelling is presumably due 
to a "peculiar . . . probabilistic" connection between disease and 
symptom, i.e., a real causal indeterminism with probability .99 in 
each case to produce swelling. The generalization in question would 
thus be nomological, creating both the possibility and the necessity 
of statistical explanation. 
Given such genuine statistical laws, how does Hempel claim statisti- 
cal explanation should proceed? He begins his account by distinguishing 
two sorts of statistical explanation. The first, deductive-statistical (D-S) 
explanation, involves "the deductive subsumption of a narrow statisti- 
cal uniformity under more comprehensive ones" ([3], p. 380). The 
second, he argues, is of a qualitatively different sort: 
Ultimately . .. statistical laws are meant to be applied to particular 
occurrences and to establish explanatory and predictive connec- 
tions among them. ([3], p. 381) 
To make such laws relevant to "particular occurrences," Hempel 
believes we must go beyond the reach of deduction, and so he proposes 
an inductive model of statistical explanation. 
Inductive-statistical (I-S) explanation proceeds by adducing statisti- 
cal laws and associated initial conditions relative to which the explan- 
andum is highly probable. High relative probability is required because, 
on Hempel's view, statistical laws become explanatorily relevant to 
an individual chance event only by giving us a basis upon which 
to inductively infer its occurrence with "practical certainty." Yet 
although an I-S explanation shows the explanandum to have been 
"nomically expectable" relative to the explanans, it does not permit 
detachment of a conclusion; it is less an inference than the expression 
of an inferential relationship: the explanandum receives a high degree 
of epistemic support from the explanans. If, for example, we learn 
that Jones has contracted infectious mononucleosis, we may infer 
with practical certainty that he will develop lymph-gland swelling. 
The same inference serves as an I-S explanation of the swelling, 
should it occur. Should it not occur, we would have no explanation 
for this, on Hempel's model. 
However, further investigation of Jones' medical history might reveal 
that he suffered mononucleosis once before, and failed to develop 
210 
MODEL OF PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION 
any swelling. Let us suppose that such individuals have a much higher 
than normal probability of not showing swelling in any later bouts 
with mononucleosis, say .9 rather than .01. This new law and new 
information about Jones together permit an inference with practical 
certainty to the conclusion that he will not develop swelling, and 
thus support a corresponding I-S explanation. Relative to these new 
facts, however, no I-S explanation would be available should Jones, 
improbably, develop swelling. What are we to say now about the 
previous I-S explanation, which had just the opposite result? Hempel 
would reject it as no longer maximally specific relative to what we 
believe about Jones' case. The requirement of maximal specificity 
is a complicated affair,3 but the basic idea is that we refer each 
case to the narrowest class of cases to which our present beliefs 
assign it in which the explanandum has a characteristically different 
probability. In Jones' case, the narrower class is clearly the class 
of those contracting mononucleosis for a second time who failed 
to develop lymph-gland swelling the first time. 
If more information about Jones or new discoveries about mononu- 
cleosis turn up, we may be forced to move on to still another 
explanation. I-S explanations must be relativized to our current 
"epistemic situation," and are subject to change along with it. Hempel 
notes that this sets off I-S explanations from D-N and D-S explanations 
in a fundamental way: 
. . . the concept of statistical explanation for particular events 
is essentially relative to a given knowledge situation as represented 
by a class K of accepted statements. . . . [W] e can significantly 
speak of true D-N and D-S explanations: they are those potential 
D-N and D-S explanations whose premises (and hence also 
conclusions) are true-no matter whether this happens to be known 
or believed, and thus no matter whether the premises are included 
in K. But this idea has no significant analogue for I-S explanation 
.... ([3], pp. 402-403) 
On Hempel's view, neither of the two contradictory explanations 
concerning Jones contains false premises, and the explananda in each 
case do indeed receive the degree of support indicated. It is just 
that we no longer regard the evidential relationship expressed by 
the first as explanatorily relevant. Were Jones to develop swelling 
after all, it would now have to be regarded as inexplicable. 
What I take to be the two most bothersome features of I-S arguments 
as models for statistical explanation-the requirement of high proba- 
3See, for example, [4]. 
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bility and the explicit relativization to our present epistemic situation 
(bringing with it an exclusion of questions about the truth of I-S 
explanations)-derive from the inductive character of such inferences, 
not from the nature of statistical explanation itself. If a non-inductive 
model for the statistical explanation of particular facts is given, there 
need be no temptation to require high probability or exclude truth. 
3. Jeffrey's Criticism of I-S Explanation. Richard C. Jeffrey has 
criticized Hempel's account on the grounds that statistical explanation 
is not a form of inference at all, except when the probability of 
the explanandum is "so high as to allow us to reason, in any decision 
problem, as if its probability were 1" ( [5] , p. 105). For such exceptional, 
"beautiful" cases, Jeffrey accepts I-S inferences as explanatory 
because they provide virtual "proof that the phenomenon does take 
place" ([5], p. 106). 
For unbeautiful cases, there is no way of proving (in advance) 
that the explanandum phenomenon will occur. According to Jeffrey, 
the explanation why such unbeauties come to be is a curt "By chance." 
He has more to say on how they come about: 
. in the statistical case I find it strained to speak of knowledge 
why the outcome is such-and-such. I would rather speak of 
understanding the process, for the explanation is the same no 
matter what the outcome: it consists of a statement that the process 
is a stochastic one, following such-and-such a law.4 ([5], p. 24) 
Jeffrey is surely right, as against Hempel, that probable and improba- 
ble outcomes of indeterministic processes are equally explicable, and 
explicable in the same way. After all, why should it be explicable 
that a genuinely random wheel of fortune with 99 red stops and 1 
black stop came to a halt on red, but inexplicable that it halted on 
black? Worse, on Hempel's view, halting at any particular stop would 
be inexplicable, even though the wheel must halt at some particular 
stop in order to yield the explicable outcome red. 
But I fail to see how Jeffrey can defend his exemption of beautiful 
cases against a similar line of argument. If the burden in statistical 
explanation really lies with "understanding the process ... no matter 
what the outcome," then why should it matter whether the outcome 
is so highly probable "as to allow us to reason, in any decision problem, 
as if its probability were 1?" The neglect Jeffrey shows here toward 
minute chances is appropriate for the practical task of decision-making 
(and perhaps explained by his generally subjectivist approach to 
4A typographical error has been corrected. 
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probability), but we must not overlook them in the not-entirely-practical 
task of explaining. Virtually impossible events may occur, and they 
deserve and can receive the same explanation as the merely improbable 
or the virtually certain. 
4. A D-NModel of Probabilistic Explanation. I will present my account 
of probabilistic explanation by developing an example of just such 
"practically negligible"--but physically real and lawful-chance: 
alpha-decay in long-lived radioactive elements. The mean-life of the 
more stable radionuclides is so long as to make the probability for 
any particular nucleus of such an element to decay during our lifetimes 
effectively zero. But our nuclear theory shows that it is not zero, 
and explains how such rarities can occur. 
On the account offered here, probabilistic explanations will be either 
true or false independent of our epistemic situation. Moreover, to 
explain, they must be true. Here I am following Hempel's usage 
in calling an explanatory argument true just in case it is valid and 
its premises are true ([3], p. 338). Such an explanation will not be 
true if the probabilistic laws it invokes are not true; in particular, 
it will not be true unless the process responsible for the explanandum 
is genuinely indeterministic. If alpha-decay is to serve as our paradigm 
for probabilistic explanation, we must be correct in assuming that 
the probabilistic wave-mechanical account of particle transmission 
through the nuclear potential barrier tells us all there is to know 
about the cause of alpha-decay. At least, it must be true that there 
are no hidden variables characterizing unknown initial conditions that 
suffice to account for alpha-decay deterministically. However, I take 
it to be uncontroversial that alpha-decay is an indeterministic process, 
if any is. 
Let us suppose that we are given an individual instance of alpha-decay 
to explain: a nucleus of radionuclide Uranium238, call it 'u', has emitted 
an alpha-particle during the time interval lasting from to to to + 0, 
where 0 is very small and expressed in standard units. Since the 
mean-life of U238 is 6.5 x 109 years, the probability of observing 
a decay by u during this interval is exceedingly small, but unques- 
tionably exists (witness the decay). This probability can be given 
precisely by using the radioactive decay constant X238 characteristic 
of all atoms of U238. Significantly, we need not know when in the 
course of the history of u time to occurs: the probability of decay 
is unaffected by the age of the atom. Therefore, as long as decay 
has not yet occurred, individual "trials"-consisting of observing 
a single isolated radioactive nucleus for successive intervals of the 
same length-are statistically independent. Using these two facts we 
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can determine the probability of decay for individual nuclei during 
any time interval chosen: it will be 1 minus the probability that any 
such nucleus survives the interval intact; for u, (1 - exp(-X238 ? )). 
To obtain experimental confirmation of this value, we infer from 
the probability to decay of individual nuclei to statistical features 
of sample populations of nuclei, e.g., half-life and mean-life. These 
predicted statistical features are then checked against actual observed 
relative frequencies in large populations over long intervals. Physical 
probabilities of the sort being considered here are therefore to be 
contrasted with statistical probabilities; the former express the strength 
of a certain physical possibility for a given system, while the latter 
reduce to claims about the (limiting) relative frequencies of traits 
in sample populations. Much well-founded doubt has been expressed 
about the applicability of statistical probabilities to single cases, but 
physical probabilities are located in the features of the single case. 
Therefore, we can understand our nuclear theory as implying strictly 
universal (physical) probability-attributing laws of the form: 
(1) All nuclei of radioelement E have probability (1 - exp(-XE 
t)) to emit an alpha-particle during any time interval of 
length t, unless subjected to environmental radiation. 
Because schema (1) is universal in form, its instances are candidates 
for law premises in deductive-nomological inferences concerning 
individual nuclei. Thus, for u: 
(2) (a) All nuclei of U238 have probability (1 - exp(-X238 ? 0)) 
to emit an alpha-particle during any interval of length 0, 
unless subjected to environmental radiation. 
(b) u was a nucleus of U238 at time to, and was subjected 
to no environmental radiation before or during the interval 
to- (to + 0). 
(c) u had probability (1 - exp(-238 ? 0)) to emit an alpha- 
particle during the interval to - (to + 0). 
(2), it appears, gives a D-N explanation only of the fact that u had 
such-and-such a probability to decay during the interval in question, 
but we should look a bit closer. I submit that (2), when supplemented 
as follows, is the probabilistic explanation of u's decay: 
(3) A derivation of (2a) from our theoretical account of the 
mechanism at work in alpha-decay. 
The D-N inference (2). 
A parenthetic addendum to the effect that u did alpha-decay 
during the interval to - (to + 0). 
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Am I merely making a virtue of necessity, and saying that since 
(3) contains all we can say about u's decay, (3) must explain it? 
In fact, there is a great deal more we could say about u's decay. 
Deliberately left out of (3) are innumerable details about the experi- 
mental apparatus (temperature, pressure, location, etc.), about the 
beliefs and expectations of those monitoring the experiment, and about 
the epistemic position of the scientific community at the time. These 
facts are omitted as explanatorily irrelevant to u's decay because 
they are causally irrelevant to the physical possibility for decay that 
obtained during the interval in question, and to whether or not that 
possibility was realized.5 A full account of these notions of explanatory 
and causal relevance is not possible here, so instead I will go on 
to argue that what (3) comprises is explanatorily relevant, and explana- 
tory. 
I must begin this task with a defense of the nomological status 
of (2a), and of the legitimacy of treating it as a covering law for 
u's decay. The following criterion of nomologicality will be used: 
a law is a universal truth derivable from our theory without appeal 
to particular facts. This criterion of course lacks generality (what 
counts as theory if not the laws themselves?), fails to segregate natural 
from logical laws, picks out only so-called "universal" (as opposed 
to "local") laws, and is entirely too vague (how to distinguish 
"particular facts" from the rest?). But I trust it will do for now. 
The motive for excluding "particular facts" is that some true, universal 
statements derivable from our theory plus particular facts would not 
normally be regarded as universal laws, but would at best be "local 
laws," e.g., 'All Homo neanderthalensis live during the late Pleistocene 
age.' 
The generalization in question here, (2a), is derived by solving the 
Schrodinger wave-equation for an alpha-particle of energy ; 4.2 MeV 
for the potential regions in and around the nucleus of an element 
with atomic number 92 and atomic weight 238, none of which are 
"particular facts," plus some simplifying assumptions about the 
structure of the nucleus and the distinctness of the alpha-particle 
within it prior to decay. While it is forbidden by classical physics 
for a low-energy particle like the - 4.2 MeV alpha-particle associated 
with U238 to pass through the 24.2 MeV potential barrier surrounding 
5Causal relevance is established here via the wave-equation. I do not mean to suggest 
that causal relevance is the only explanatory kind; cf. the mention of structural laws 
in section 1. 
Some such notion of causal relevance appears to lie behind Salmon's "statistical- 
relevance" model of probabilistic explanation. Yet what matters is whether a factor 
enters into the probabilities present, not the statistics they produce. 
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so massive a nucleus, the quantum theory predicts that the probability 
amplitude for finding such an alpha-particle outside the potential barrier 
is nonzero. Thus a transmission coefficient for U238 alpha-particles 
is determined, which, given certain simplifying assumptions about 
the goings-on inside the nucleus, yields the probability that such a 
particle will tunnel out of the potential well "per unit time for one 
nucleus," namely, 238 ( [1 ], p. 175). (2a) thus neither reports a summary 
of past observations nor expresses a mere statistical uniformity that 
scattered initial conditions would lead us to anticipate. Instead, it 
is a law of irreducibly probabilistic form, assigning definite, physically- 
determined probabilities to individual systems. 
It follows that the derivation of conclusions from (2a) by universal 
instantiation and modus ponens is unexceptionable. Were (2a) but 
a statistical generalization, properly understood as meaning "(1 - 
exp(-X238 ? 0))N of U238 nuclei in samples of sufficiently large size 
N, on average, decay during the interval to - (to + 0)," it could 
not undergo universal instantiation, and would not permit detachment 
of a conclusion about the probability obtaining in a single case. 
Further, if the wave-equation does indeed tell us all there is to 
know about the mechanism involved in nuclear barrier penetration, 
it follows that nothing more can be said to explain why the observed 
decay of u took place, once we have shown how (2a) is derived 
from our account of this mechanism, and established that (2) is valid 
and that (3)'s parenthetic addendum is true. 
Still, does (3) explain why the decay took place? It does not explain 
why the decay had to take place, nor does it explain why the decay 
could be expected to take place. And a good thing, too: there is 
no had to or could be expected to about the decay to explain-it 
is not only a chance event, but a very improbable one. (3) does 
explain why the decay improbably took place, which is how it did. 
(3) accomplishes this by demonstrating that there existed at the time 
a small but definite physical possibility of decay, and noting that, 
by chance, this possibility was realized. The derivation of (2a) that 
begins (3) shows, by assimilating alpha-decay to the chance process 
of potential barrier tunneling, how this possibility comes to exist. 
If alpha-decays are chance phenomena of the sort described, then 
once our theory has achieved all that (3) involves, it has explained 
them to the hilt, however unsettling this may be to a priori intuitions. 
To insist upon stricter subsumption of the explanandum is not merely 
to demand what (alas) cannot be, but what decidedly should not be: 
sufficient reason that one probability rather than another be realized, 
that is, chances without chance. 
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Because of the peculiar nature of chance phenomena, it is explana- 
torily relevant whether the probability in question was realized, even 
though there is no before-the-fact explanatory argument, deductive 
or inductive, to this conclusion. Indeed, it is the absence of such 
an argument that makes a place in probabilistic explanation for a 
parenthetic addendum concerning whether the possibility became 
actual in the circumstances given. These addenda may offend those 
who believe that explanations must always be arguments, but at the 
most general level explanations are accounts, not arguments. It so 
happens that for deterministic phenomena inferences of a particular 
kind-D-N arguments meeting the desiderata suggested in section 
1-are explanatory accounts, and this for good reasons. However, 
indeterministic phenomena are a different matter, and explanatory 
accounts of them must be different as well. If the present model 
is accepted, then almost all of the explanatory burden in probabilistic 
explanation can be placed on deductive arguments-those charac- 
terizing the indeterministic mechanism and those attributing a certain 
probability to the explanandum. But these arguments leave out a 
crucial part of the story: did the chance fact obtain? 
The parenthetic addendum fills this gap in the account, and commu- 
nicates information that is relevant to the causal origin of the explanan- 
dum by telling us that it came about as the realization of a particular 
physical possibility. Further, it permits us to chain probabilistic 
explanations together to make more comprehensive explanations, in 
which each link is able to bear the full explanatory burden for the 
fact it covers, and is capable of leading us on to the next fact in 
the causal sequence being explained. From (2) alone we cannot move 
directly to an account of what the alpha-particle did to a nearby 
photographic plate, but only to a probability (and a miserably low 
one) that this account will be true. The parenthetic addendum to 
(3) furnishes a non-probabilistic premise from which to begin an account 
of the condition of the photographic plate: the occurrence of an 
alpha-decay in the vicinity. Dropping off the addendum leaves an 
explanation, but it is a D-N explanation of the occurrence of a particular 
probability, not a probabilistic explanation of the occurrence of a 
particular decay. 
The scheme for probabilistic explanation of particular chance facts 
by nomic subsumption that is being offered here, the deductive- 
nomological-probabilistic (D-N-P) model, is this. First we display (or 
truthfully claim an ability to display) a derivation from our theory 
of a law of essentially probabilistic form, complete with an account 
of how the law applies to the deterministic process in question. The 
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derived law is of the form: 
(4a) VtVx [F~, -> Prob(G)x, = p] 
"At any time, anything that is F has probability p to be 
Next, we adduce the relevant fact(s) about the case at hand, e: 
(4b) F, to 
"e is F at time t," 
and draw the obvious conclusion: 
(4c) Prob(G)e,t = p 
"e has probability p to be G at time to." 
To which we add parenthetically, and according to how things turn 
out: 
(4d) (Ge to/-Ge, to) 
"(e did/did not become G at to)." 
Whether a D-N-P explanation is true will depend solely upon the 
truth-values of its premises and addendum, and the validity of its 
logic. I leave open what becomes of a D-N-P explanation that contains 
true laws, initial facts, and addendum, but botches the theoretical 
account of the laws invoked. Let us simply say that the more botched, 
the less satisfactory the explanation. 
The law premise (4a) will be true if all things at all times satisfy 
the conditional 'F,t -> Prob(G),t = p', using whatever reading of 
'->' we decide upon for the analysis of natural laws in general. It 
will be false if there exists a partition of the Fs into those with 
physical probability r to be G and those with physical probability 
s to be G, where s = r j p. Such a partition might exist according 
to some other interpretation of probability, but this would not affect 
the truth of (4a). For example, suppose that a coin toss meeting 
certain specifications is an indeterministic event with probability 4 
of yielding heads. We now perform the experiment of repeating such 
a toss a great many times. Curiously, all and only even numbered 
tosses yield heads. This result supplies certain frequentists with grounds 
for saying that Prob(heads, even-numbered toss) = 1, while Prob(heads, 
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odd-numbered toss) = 0.6 But because all tosses met the specification 
laid down, the probability of heads was the same, , on each toss, 
despite the curious behavior. Such behavior may make us suspicious 
of our original claims about the indeterminacy of the process or about 
the physical probability it has of producing heads, but is no proof 
against them. Indeed, the original probability attribution requires us 
to assign a definite physical probability to just such an untoward 
sequence of outcomes, the occurrence of which therefore hardly 
contradicts this attribution. 
The particular fact premise (4b) will be true iff e is an F during 
the time in question, and not either an F* (with probability r i 
p to be G) or an F** (with probability q = p to be G, but unlike 
an F in other respects). Using the (let us say) true law that all F**s 
have probability q = p to be G, and the falsehood that e is an F**, 
we could derive a true conclusion, indistinguishable from (4c). Hence 
the requirement that the premises be true if the argument is to explain; 
and if we reason logically from true premises, the conclusion will 
take care of itself. 
5. Epistemic Relativity and Maximal Specificity Disowned. Have I kept 
my promise to give an account of probabilistic explanation free from 
relativization to our present epistemic situation? 
Let us return to explanation (3), and admit that it is not the whole 
story: 23% of the alpha-particles emitted by U238 have kinetic energy 
4.13 MeV, while the remaining 77% have 4.18 MeV. Therefore there 
are two different decay constants, X4.13 and X 418; both are distinct 238 23  
from -238, used in (3). Hence we must be quite careful in stating 
what exactly (3) explains. It does not explain the particular event 
observed, for this was either a 4.13 or a 4.18 MeV decay, neither 
of which has probability \238 in unit time. Instead, (3) explains the 
particularfact about the event observed that we set out to explain, 
namely, that an alpha-decay with unspecified energy (or direction, 
or angular momentum, etc.) took place at nucleus u during the time 
interval in question. This fact does have probability X238 of obtaining 
in unit time, representing the sum of the two energy-correlated 
probabilities with which such a decay might occur. 
6Cf. the discussion of place selections and homogeneity in [6], sections 4 and 7. 
Salmon's criterion, which requires formal randomness, would here fail to distinguish 
a randomly-produced regular sequence from a deterministically-produced one. Notwith- 




If we should learn that the decay of u was of a 4.18 MeV 
alpha-particle, an explanation of this fact would have to be referred 
to the more specific class of decays with probability X4' 8 in unit 
time. Is the maximal specificity requirement thereby resurrected? There 
is no need for it. (3) is not an unspecific explanation of this more 
specific fact, but a fallacious one. It would be logically corrupt to 
conclude from law (2a) that an individual U238 nucleus has probability 
(1 - exp(-X238 ? 0)) to decay with energy 4.18 Me Vduring any interval 
of length 0, since (2a) says nothing whatsoever about decay energies. 
The only relevant conclusion to draw from (2a) is (2c), which remains 
true in the face of our more detailed knowledge about the event 
in question. Nor is law (2a) falsified by the discovery of a 23:77 
proportional distribution of decay energies, and the associated dif- 
ference in decay rates. For according to our nuclear theory, there 
is no difference in initial condition between a nucleus about to emit 
a 4.13 MeV alpha-particle and one about to emit a 4.18 MeV alpha- 
particle. It remains true that all U238 nuclei have probability X238 to 
decay in unit time, but it is further true that all have probability 
x423 to decay one way, and probability 3488 to decay another. 
It must next be determined whether the existence of a difference 
in probability due to a difference in initial condition can be handled 
by the D-N-P model without appeal to a maximal specificity require- 
ment. To permit consideration of possible epistemological complica- 
tions, it will be assumed that neither the difference in probability 
nor the partition of initial conditions is known at the start. 
Imagine that, although we do not know it, in virtue of certain 
permanent structural features 23 % of all naturally-occurring U238 nuclei 
fall into a class P, and the remaining 77% into a class -P, such 
that only those in P have any probability of emitting a 4.13 MeV 
alpha-particle, and only those in class -P have any probability of 
emitting a 4.18 MeV alpha-particle. Suppose further that these two 
laws have been derived: 
(5) (a) All U238 nuclei of type P have probability (1 - exp (- X4.13 
t)) to emit a 4.13 MeV alpha-particle during any time 
interval of length t, unless subjected to environmental 
radiation. 
(b) All U238 nuclei of type -P have probability (1 - exp 
(-X2388. t)) to emit a 4.18 MeV alpha-particle during any 
time interval of length t, unless subjected to environmental 
radiation. 
Note that, by our assumptions, the specification of the kinetic energy 
220 
MODEL OF PROBABILISTIC EXPLANATION 
of the particle (possibly) emitted may be dropped from (5a) and (5b) 
without altering the truth of either. 
Until the structural differences between types P and -P are 
discovered and understood, (3) will stand as the accepted explanation 
of u's decay. However, once (5a) and (5b) have become known, 
it will be clear from the fact that u's alpha-emission had kinetic energy 
4.18 MeV that u must have been of type -P prior to decay. Thus 
a more specific account of u's decay will be available to scientists, 
who, already familiar with the theoretical derivation of law (5b), offer 
the following truncated D-N-P version of this account: 
(6) (a) All nuclei of U238 of type -P have probability (1 - exp 
(-_418 . 0)) to emit an alpha-particle during any time 
interval of length 0, unless subjected to environmental 
radiation. 
(b) u was a nucleus of U238 of type -P at to, and was subjected 
to no environmental radiation before or during the interval 
to- (to + 0). 
(c) u had probability (1 - exp (-_3'8 ? 0)) to emit an 
alpha-particle during the interval to - (to + 0). 
(d) (And it did.) 
On the Hempelian model (modified so as to permit I-S explanations 
of improbable phenomena), there is no problem in accounting for 
the previous acceptability of the I-S counterpart of (3), or for its 
present unacceptability. (3) had been maximally specific relative to 
our previous beliefs about alpha-decay in U238, but no longer is, and 
so is superseded by the more specific (relatively speaking) I-S coun- 
terpart of (6). 
On the D-N-P model, too, there is no problem in accounting for 
the acceptability of (3) prior to the discovery of class -P and law 
(5b): (3)'s premises (and, of course, addendum) were taken to be 
true. The question is whether, in light of current beliefs, (3) can 
be ruled out-and (6) ruled in-without invocation of Hempelian 
constraints. Resolution of the problem (3) and (6) pose through 
epistemic relativization and maximal specificity requirements seems 
to me unacceptable. If we were to attribute to nucleus u two unequal 
probabilities to alpha-decay in a specified way during a single time 
interval, adding, "Let's pick the most specifically defined value for 
explanatory purposes," we'd be showing an unseemly tolerance for 
contradiction in our nuclear theory-and why stop there? Better to 
face up to the confrontation over truth between (3) and (6), and 
replace complex and unappealingly relativistic maximal specificity 
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requirements with the simple requirement of truth. The D-N-P model 
does this. The current unacceptability of (3) is located not in premises 
insufficiently specific, but in premises insufficiently true, i.e., false. 
Contrary to (3)'s purported covering law (2a), not all nuclei of U238 
have probability X238 to decay in unit time if unperturbed by radia- 
tion-in fact, none do. In spite of giving accurate expectation values 
for decay rates in large samples of U238, (2a) is false, and so explanation 
(3) is ruled out as unsound. Explanation (6), on the other hand, meets 
the simple requirement of truth, and rules itself in.7 
Problems about incomplete, misleading, or false beliefs do not bear 
on whether D-N-P explanations have unrelativized truth-values, but 
concern rather difficulties in establishing the truth-values they unrel- 
ativistically have. Relativization to our current epistemic situation 
comes into play only when we begin to discuss whether a given D-N-P 
explanation seems true. Whether it is true is another matter. 
6. Objections to the D-N-P Model. I cannot pretend to have said enough 
about deductive-nomological-probabilistic explanation to have charac- 
terized this model adequately. Such reservations as were expressed 
in section 1 about taking nomic subsumption under a causal law as 
sufficient for explanation are still in force, and little has been 
done-except by way of example-to show how the account offered 
here might accommodate them. 
That the probabilistic laws invoked in D-N-P explanations are even 
(in some relevant sense) causal cannot be defended until a plausible 
account of physical probability has been worked out, a task well 
beyond the scope of this paper. Under a propensity interpretation, 
probability has the characteristics sought: a probability is the expression 
of the strength of a physical tendency in an individual chance system 
to produce a particular outcome; it is therefore straightforwardly 
applicable to single cases; and it is (in a relevant sense) causally 
responsible for that outcome whenever it is realized. However, 
propensities are notoriously unclear. For now I can at best assume 
that clarification is possible, point to a promising start in the attempt 
to do so-R. N. Giere, "Objective, Single-Case Probabilities and 
the Foundations of Statistics" ([2])-, and admit that the D-N-P 
model is viable only if sense can be made of propensities, or of 
objective, physical, lawful, single-case probabilities by any other name. 
As for the requirement that explanations elucidate mechanisms, 
I can only repeat that an essential role is played in D-N-P explanations 
7Explanation (6) is true, however, only under the contrary-to-fact assumption-made 
for the sake of the example-of the existence of a class -P. 
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by the theoretical deduction of the probabilistic law(s) covering the 
explanandum. 
In lieu of further exposition, I offer the beginnings of a defense, 
hoping thereby to sketch out the account a bit more fully in those 
areas most likely to be controversial. 
Because it applies only to genuinely indeterministic processes, of which 
there are few (if any), D-N-P explanation is too restricted in scope. It 
is widely believed that the probabilities associated with standard 
gambling devices, classical thermodynamics, actuarial tables, weather 
forecasting, etc., arise not from any underlying physical indeterminism, 
but from an unknown or uncontrolled scatter of initial conditions. 
If this is right, then D-N-P explanation would be inapplicable to 
these phenomena even though they are among the most familiar objects 
of probabilistic explanation. I do not, however, find this troublesome: 
if something does not happen by chance, it cannot be explained by 
chance. The use of epistemic or statistical probabilities in connection 
with such phenomena unquestionably has instrumental value, and 
should not be given up. What must be given up is the idea that 
explanations can be based on probabilities that have no role in bringing 
the world's explananda about, but serve only to describe deterministic 
phenomena.8 Whether there are any probabilites that enter into the 
mechanisms of nature is still debated, but the successes of the 
quantum-mechanical formalism, and the existence of "no hidden 
variable" results for it, place the burden of proof on those who would 
insist that physical chance is an illusion. 
It could be objected more justly that D-N-P explanation is too 
broad, not too narrow, in scope. Once restrictions have been lifted 
from the value a chance may have in probabilistic explanation, virtually 
all explanations of particular facts must become probabilistic. All 
but the most basic regularities of the universe stand forever in peril 
of being interrupted or upset by intrusion of the effects of random 
processes. It might seem a fine explanation for a light's going out 
that we opened the only circuit connecting it with an electrical power 
source, but an element of chance was involved: had enough atoms 
in the vicinity of the light undergone spontaneous beta-decay at the 
right moment, the electrons emitted could have kept it glowing. The 
success of a social revolution might appear to be explained by its 
overwhelming popular support, but this is to overlook the revolu- 
80f course, we might speak of statistical or epistemic probabilities as causes of, 
e.g., beliefs. But if belief formation is not physically probabilistic, then probabilistic 
explanation of it would be impossible, in spite of this sort of causal involvement 
on the part of statistical or epistemic probabilities. 
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tionaries' luck: if all the naturally unstable nuclides on earth had 
commenced spontaneous nuclear fission in rapid succession, the 
triumph of the people would never have come to pass. 
No doubt this proliferation of probabilistic explanations is counter- 
intuitive, but contemporary science will not let us get away with 
any other sort of explanation in these cases-it simply cannot supply 
the requisite non-probabilistic laws. Because they figure in the way 
things work, tiny probabilities appropriately figure in explanations 
of the way things are, even though they scarcely ever show up in 
the way things turn out. 
The D-N-P model breaks the link between prediction and explana- 
tion. Hempel has justified a "qualified thesis of the structural identity 
of explanation and prediction" with this principle: 
Any rationally acceptable answer to the question 'Why did X 
occur?' must offer information which shows that X was to be 
expected-if not definitely, then at least with reasonable certainty. 
([3], pp. 367-368) 
Abundantly many D-N-P explanations-all those covering less than 
highly probable facts-violate this condition. 
However, to abide by this condition and renounce explanations 
with meager probabilities I take to be worse. Why forgo the explana- 
tions of improbable phenomena offered by our theories, when these 
explanations provide as much of an account of why (and how) their 
explananda occur as do the explanations of "reasonably certain" 
phenomena that Hempel's condition sanctions? 
Too restrictive as it stands, Hempel's condition may be taken in 
a way not incompatible with D-N-P explanation. A D-N-P explanation 
does yield one prediction that is perfectly strict, to the effect that 
a certain physical probability exists in the circumstances given. If 
this probability fails to obtain, or to have the value attributed to 
it, the explanation must be false. It is a complaint against the world, 
not against the D-N-P model, that a direct, non-statistical test for 
the presence or value of this probability may prove impossible. 
Remarkably, the mechanisms of the world leave room for spontaneous 
nuclear disintegrations. Equally remarkably, our physical theory gives 
us insight into how they come about, and assigns determinate probabil- 
ities to them. These probabilities are connected to the rest of our 
theory by laws that permit both prediction and (where means exist) 
control: if undisturbed, nucleus a will have probabilityp to alpha-decay 
(so we should expect a's decay with epistemic probability p); and 
if we wish to alter p, our theory tells us how a must be disturbed. 
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It has been objected to the view of probability taken in this paper 
that unless probability attributions are interpreted as predictions about 
how relative frequencies will actually come out in the long run, 
probabilistic laws lack empirical content. Thus, if the relative frequency 
of decayed atoms in a large sample of some radioelement were, over 
a great length of time, to diverge significantly from the probability 
theoretically attributed to decay, that attribution would not be "borne 
out," i.e., would be falsified. Otherwise, it is argued, probabilistic 
laws are compatible with all frequencies, and empirically vacuous. 
But it is impossible for a world to "bear out" all of its probability- 
attributing laws in this sense. For these laws imply, among other 
things, that it is extremely unlikely that all actual long-run sequences 
will show a relative frequency near to the single-case probability. 
Therefore, the demand that all long-run decay rates nearly match 
all corresponding decay constants comes to a demand that nothing 
improbable show up in the long run, which is itself an improbability 
showing up in the long run. Intended to clear things up on the 
epistemological front, this proposal cannot even get out of its own 
way. 
By splitting apart probabilistic explanation and induction, the D-N-P 
model has lost the point of probabilistic explanation. Behind this 
objection lies the view that probabilistic (or statistical) explanation 
is an activity fundamentally unlike D-N explanation. A probabilistic 
explanation is seen as a piece of detective work. Unable to give 
a causal demonstration of the explanandum from evidence thus far 
assembled, we develop hypotheses, which are judged by how probable 
they are on the evidence, and whether they make the explanandum 
sufficiently probable. In the end, we put forward the most convincing 
inductive argument yet found-the one making the explanandum most 
antecedently probable, given what else we know about events leading 
up to it. 
This view of probabilistic explanation confuses epistemic with 
objective probability, and induction with explanation. Perhaps re- 
sponsible for this confusion is the similarity of the tasks of explaining 
a phenomenon, gathering support for such an explanation, and gather- 
ing before- or after-the-fact evidence for a phenomenon's occurrence. 
This confusion is abetted by misleading ways of talking about "strong" 
or "good" explanations. We should distinguish the following. (i) A 
strong (good) explanation is one that has great theoretical power, 
regardless of how well-confirmed it is or how probable it holds the 
explanandum to be. (ii) A strong (good) candidate for explanation 
is a proffered explanation with well-confirmed premises, regardless 
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of how probable it holds the explanandum to be and irrespective 
of how theoretically powerful it happens to be. (iii) A strong (good) 
reasonfor believing that the explanandum fact will obtain is furnished 
by before-the-fact evidence that leads, via one's theory, to an expecta- 
tion of the explanandum with high epistemic probability. (iv) A strong 
(good) reason for believing that the explanandum fact obtained is 
given by any evidence that lends high epistemic probability to the 
proposition that the explanandum fact is a fact. Strong after-the-fact 
evidence, even for very improbable events, may be easy to come 
by. Reasons of types (iii) and (iv) need have nothing to do with 
explanation, and may be based on symptoms (Will it rain today?- 
Harry's rheumatism is acting up) or even less causally relevant 
information (Was Sue upset?-Her brother is certain she would have 
been). 
Although the link between probabilistic explanation and induction 
is looser on the D-N-P model than on the I-S model, this is no 
fault: on Hempel's account it was entirely too close. Measuring the 
strength or "acceptability" of an explanation by the magnitude of 
the probability it confers on the explanandum blurs the distinctions 
just made. Keeping (i)-(iv) distinct, the D-N-P model enables us 
to state quite simply the object of induction in explanation: given 
a particular fact, to find, and gather evidence for, an explanans that 
subsumes it; given a generalization, to find, and gather evidence for, 
a higher-level explanans that subsumes it; in all cases, then, to discover 
and establish a true and relevant explanans. The issue of showing 
the explanandum to have high (relative or absolute) probability is 
a red herring, distracting attention from the real issue: the truth or 
falsity, and applicability, of the laws and facts adduced in explanatory 
accounts. 
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